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The increasing availability of large-scale, complex data has made research into how
human genomes determine physiology in health and disease, as well as its application
to drug development and medicine, an attractive field for artificial intelligence (AI)
approaches. Looking at recent developments, we explore how such approaches inter-
connect and may conflict with needs for and notions of causal knowledge in molecular
genetics and genomic medicine. We provide reasons to suggest that—while capable of
generating predictive knowledge at unprecedented pace and scale—if and how these
approaches will be integrated with prevailing causal concepts will not only determine
the future of scientific understanding and self-conceptions in these fields. But these
questions will also be key to develop differentiated policies, such as for education
and regulation, in order to harness societal benefits of AI for genomic research and
medicine.
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INTRODUCTION
Most practical or commercial technology developments that stand for
the change, promise and fears ascribed to artificial intelligence (AI),
such as in computer vision, robotics or financial modeling, are based
on new machine learning (ML) techniques like deep learning models
in particular, that rapidly evolved in the last decade.[1–3] Current such
techniques can analyze large and complex data sets based on statis-
tical modeling, using correlative associations from observational data
for predicting outcomes.[4] Deep learning has proven to be particularly
powerful for flexibly deriving patterns andpredictivemodels fromsuch
Abbreviations: AI, artificial intelligence; DL, deep learning; CPG, Clinical Practice Guidelines;
EBM, evidence-basedmedicine; GWAS, genome-wide association studies; ML, machine
learning; RCTs, randomized controlled trials; R&D, research and development
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data sets and for independently optimizing models (for AI and ML, see
Box 1). Furthermore, certain methods such as deep learning are “black
boxes” as it is hard for humans to recapitulate how and why predictive
outcomes are achieved (Box 2).
Given increasingly large and complex data sets from biomedical
research (such as on genome sequences or gene expression) and clin-
ical medical practice (including from electronic health records and
biobanks), academic research institutions as well as biotech and tech-
nology companies have developed andusedAI/ML in various areas.[8,9]
These are mainly the prediction of pharmaceutical properties of drug
targets and drug candidates,[10] pattern recognition onmedical images
(such asmagnetic resonance imaging) or histopathological analyses for
diagnosis or monitoring disease states.[9] Another important applica-
tion area is the analysis of multimodal data such as from genomics and
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BOX. 1
Artificial intelligence (AI) andmachine learning (ML)
The terms AI and ML are often used interchangeably. How-
ever, though there appears to be no strict definition of AI, it
may be best described as the (broader) vision of science and
engineering to generate computers and software that can
perform in ways that were thought to require human intelli-
gence. In contrast,ML constitutes a subfield of AI—with deep
learning (DL) as a subset of ML—in which software and mod-
eling automatically improve through experience (which is not
a necessary condition for AI overall).[3]
ML encompasses three major classes: supervised learning,
unsupervised learning and reinforcement learning. Super-
vised learning aims to predict (as output) a classification or
label of data points (e.g., a property of an item) by using a
given set of labeled training examples (providing input fea-
tures known about the item). In unsupervised learning, the
aim is to learn inherent patterns within the data themselves.
Reinforcement learning is basedon rewardingdesired and/or
punishing undesired behavior of software agents (following
a trial-and-error approach). The main difference between
“standard” ML methods such as logistic regression or sup-
port vector machines and DL is that DLmodels have a higher
capacity and are much more flexible (with typically millions
of trainable parameters). Thus DL is very flexible in the kinds
of relationships between inputs (such as genetic variants or
epigenetic marks, in the case of genomics) and outputs (e.g.,
cell-type specific expression of protein forms) that they can
model and has proven to be particularly powerful in deriving
patterns and models for making predictions from large and
complex data sets.[1,5,6] DL models are based on software-
simulated multiple layers of artificial neurons (“deep neural
networks”) and canhavedifferent architectures, correspond-
ing to different assumptions about data and different tasks.
For example, convolutional neural networks can capture spe-
cial spatial dependencies (e.g., to analyze medical images or
patterns in biological sequences), while recurrent neuronal
networks are suited to handle sequential or time-series data
(such as for genomic splicing code analysis or EEG-based pre-
diction of epileptic seizures).[5–7]
other omics fields, and their combination with clinical data, in order to
generate newdiagnostic andpredictivemodels for diseases (like in can-
cer liquid biopsies[11]) and/or for their underlying genetic causes.[5,6]
The black-box character of some important AI/MLmethods is often
seen as amain challenge for their use. The de facto inability by humans
to “explain” or “interprete” how these models generate predictive out-
comes has widely been argued to be especially important in the med-
ical domain, mainly based on two grounds. First, there may be high
risks linked to potential flaws and biases in models and data, and a
BOX. 2
Black boxes in AI andmedicine
Sophisticated forms of ML are especially powerful and flexi-
ble in the kinds of relationships between inputs that they can
model (Box 1). In deep learning models this typically involves
automatic adjusting ofmillions of parameters to create a net-
work that most accurately transforms the inputs into output
predictions.[5,6] Due to this automatic adjustment or “learn-
ing” and the sheer size of the resulting networks, however,
these models are “black boxes”: they are hard to “explain” or
to “interprete” by humanswith respect to how and/orwhy an
outcome is achieved. No human may step through the vast
number of operations or non-linear associations (taking the
input data and model parameters) to recapitulate the model
predictions, at least not in reasonable time.[12,13]
There is an increasing number of techniques from “explain-
able AI” research to provide insight about the internal
operation of such networks (such as automatic-rule extrac-
tion), or networks built to explain themselves. But although
such methods may help in providing relevant information, it
appears still unclear what the best type of explanation met-
ric should be for different purposes, such as risk assessment
and oversight by experts or regulators, or the evaluation of
recommendations by health care practitioners.[12,13]
Though the black-box character of certain AI/ML system is
broadly discussed as a key challenge in relation to applica-
tions in medicine, the black-box issue has not been intro-
duced to medicine through AI/ML. The most important
instrument in evidence-basedmedicine (EBM) for testing the
efficacy and safety of drugs or treatments (and for approving
them), namely randomized controlled trials (RCTs) with their
underlying difference-making, probabilistic conception of
causation, can usually only provide black-box causal claims.
For they establish causal relationships between interven-
tions andmeasured end points on patient outcomes, without
providing a pathophysiological, mechanistic explanation for
why the interventions worked.[14–17]
corresponding need for system verification and improvement,[18,19,12]
including in systems that may constantly retrain and change over
time.[20] Such risks have been broadly discussed in relation to the util-
ity and safety of AI systems as well as to ethical and legal issues (such
as non-discrimination, privacy or accountability),[12] all of which have
made “interpretability” or “explainability” also an issue for regulation.
The second reason often invoked is that explanations on how these
systems work were needed for trust in, and adoption of AI/ML-based
approaches and innovations, including by users such as physicians and
patients.[18,21–23]
In this perspective, we analyze howmodern AI/ML systems interre-
late and may conflict with needs for and accounts of causal knowledge
KÖNIG ET AL. 3 of 12
in genomic research and medicine, and point out possible implications
for the future of these areas. Our analysis suggests that current discus-
sions and policy proposals too narrowly focus on the black-box issue
and that its relevance for trust in and adoption of AI/ML applications is
far less clear than previously proposed. Rather the future development
andpossible societal benefitswill be determinedby the extent towhich
knowledge fromAI/MLmodels is perceived to need experimental veri-
fication and onwhether such verification is possible.
CAUSAL REASONING AND PREDICTION IN
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH AND MEDICINE
Causal reasoning and causal accounts
While there are numerous ideas and theories throughout philosophy
about what causality actually is and what role it plays in or to explain
reality (or the physical world),[24–26] causal cognition processes appear
to be evolutionary entrenched in howwe think and act. Thusweuncon-
sciously strive to learn about causal relations in our environment and
we constantly use causal beliefs or knowledge to draw inferences or
make predictions through causal reasoning.[27] Causal reasoning, and
in particular enhanced grades of causal cognition that have occurred
later in human evolution, appear to be also important in contributing
to the development of technological innovations (including first “com-
plex” technologies suchasbowhuntingorpoisonedarrows).[28,29] Such
enhanced grades of causal cognition seem to involve abstract causal
understanding, integrating difference-making information from vari-
ous sources (e.g., one’s own interventions or interventions by others).
This allows to imagine and hypothesize causal networks and their out-
comes under varying circumstances.[28,30]
Given this strong evolutionary foundation of causal cognition pro-
cesses it may not be surprising that causation is key to various mod-
els of explanation and associated conceptions of understanding in
many special sciences,[31] including areas of modern biology, such as
molecular biology, physiology or evolutionary and developmental biol-
ogy, and (bio-)medicine.[32,33] In contrast, the place of causality in
physics, and in fundamental physics in particular, has been controver-
sially discussed.[31,34] Key issues include the nature of laws and time as
well as how to reconcile the central role of causal concepts in the spe-
cial sciences, and to identify effective strategies in practice, with the
often supposed absence of causation in fundamental physical laws.[34]
In molecular biology and biomedicine two different types of causal
accounts are common: causal-mechanistic and interventionist concep-
tions. Causal-mechanistic conceptions provide scientific explanation
by revealing the causal network of processes and interactions that lead
to the event to be explained, exploiting experimental interventions.[35]
Against this, in interventionist conceptions the goal is to observe
whether an action or a treatment causes an effect, without necessarily
making assumptions on or looking at causal mechanisms.[36] Causal
mechanistic accounts of understanding prevail in basic molecular
biology and biomedical research[32] and provide insight into molec-
ular and physiological mechanisms (e.g., linking genetic variants to
pathophysiological changes in human cells or animal models).[37–39]
Interventionist conceptions have become key in evidence-based
medicine (EBM), for example, to judge the efficacy of treatments for a
disease on patient outcomes, using randomized controlled trials (RCTs)
as itsmost important tool.[14,15] Under both conceptions, causal claims
can involve counterfactual dependencies and reasoning (i.e., allowing
to answer “what-if-things-had-been-different“ questions),[31,40] with
counterfactuals (such as using control and treatment groups in RCTs)
having become especially important to causal inference in EBM.[41]
Both conceptions on causation, but In particular the quest for
causal understanding derived from specific experimental interventions
in physiological processes, may exemplify a key notion underlying the
transition to modern science involving experimentation in the sev-
enteenth century, as famously called for by Francis Bacon: “to seek,
not pretty and probable conjectures, but certain and demonstrable
knowledge”—as “true sons of knowledge”[42] (Figure 1).
Causality, associative models and prediction
Causal concepts and knowledge derived from them can thus either
establish and/or mechanistically explain (in retrospect) why an out-
come occurred or, directed into the future, enable predictions on out-
comes. To predict future outcomes is also the aim of predictivemodels,
as in theML field. However, these models are usually based on statisti-
cally significant, but not necessarily causal, associations in the data and
thus not on knowledge about what makes outcomes happen.[4,44]
Correspondingly, causal concepts are important to basic biomedi-
cal research to uncover and understand physiological pathways, or to
prove hypotheses on them.[38,39,45] Moreover, causality is critical to
weigh interventions and their (observed or putative) effects in drug
development.[15,46,47] In contrast, associative model approaches are
often used in clinical practice to provide risk estimates, for example,
to predict whether patients are at high risk for a disease or to inform
prognoses.[48,49] Furthermore, in basic science such predictive models
may help to hypothesize likely causes or physiological mechanisms by
analyzing datasets containing complex patterns[5,44] (see also below).
CURRENT AI-BASED METHODS CONFLICT WITH
PREVAILING CAUSAL ACCOUNTS IN MOLECULAR
GENETICS
Though causality and causal modeling have become an active research
field in AI/ML,[50,51] currently established ML methods for analyzing
large and complex data are based on statistical modeling.[4,51] These
methods do not reflect genuine causal properties of the variables they
analyze or reconstruct. Instead correlative associations from observa-
tional data are used for predictive modeling of outcomes,[4,51] such as
functional consequences of genetic variants, cancer diagnoses or prop-
erties of drug candidates.[5,6,52]
Thus, Bacon’s call for “certain and demonstrable knowledge”
and experiments[42,43] (see also Figure 1) as well as the strong
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F IGURE 1 Title page for Novum organum scientiarum (second
edition, 1645) by the English philosopher and statesman Francis Bacon
who is often considered as one of the founders of modern science. In
this and other work he outlines what he believed is needed to reveal
and understand nature: to not only compile as many documented facts
from literature and systematic observations as possible but, as amain
element, to retrieve new knowledge from nature by experiments.
Intervention in nature by experiments would reveal the secrets of
nature better than observing how they “do in their usual course”[43].
The title page shows a ship passing through the Pillars of Hercules,
which symbolized the end of the knownworld. Bacon repeatedly used
this motif, drawing analogies between the exploration voyages and a
need to go beyond the boundaries of traditional knowledge. Image:
EC.B1328.620ib, Houghton Library, Harvard University
foundation of experimentation-based conceptions of causation in
molecular genetics and biomedical research appear to be in stark con-
trast to present-dayMLmethods.
Deep learning models to predict causal genetic
variants for complex traits and diseases
However, especially deep learning approaches have been suggested
to be able to reveal genomic differences, such as inherited genetic
variants, that are causally linked to traits or diseases. For these
approaches can integrate big biological data sets to predict changes
entailed by genomic differences in the complex cellular processes
(“intermediate phenotypes”) that lie in between genotype and phe-
notype. This feature is especially important for predicting effects
of variants in non-coding (often regulatory) genome regions, which
represent most genetic variants linked to common, multigenic
diseases.[5,6] Causal genetic variants influence a molecular or cellular
process to affect a disease, as opposed to variants that may be only
statistically associated with a disease via genome-wide association
studies (GWAS).[53] In fact various recent studies suggest that deep
learning models can rapidly predict cell-type specific intermediate
phenotypes, such as changes in transcription or pre-mRNA splicing,
for any DNA sequence difference (including all variants linked to traits
by GWAS). These models can so pinpoint putative causal variants for
various conditions, like cardiological, neurological and immune-related
disorders.[54–58] In some of the studies, intermediate phenotypeswere
further computationally integrated in multilevel models with gene
and protein interaction networks of physiological processes in cells
or organs, pointing to possible mechanistic pathways from genetic
alterations to disease.[55,58]
Predicted causal variants and the difficulty of
experimental proof
Yet despite efforts to make such models interpretable (e.g., allowing
conclusions on how certain inputs may be linked to outputs),[58] rig-
orous proof that a genetic variant or a pathway is in fact “causal” has
widely been suggested to require functional verification by experimen-
tal interventions. Such experiments would in particular include intro-
ducing corresponding variants or inactivating target genes in human
cell-basedmodels or inmodel organisms relevant for a disease.[38,39,59]
This kind of proof is hard to achieve though, especiallywhen it comes to
themyriad of common variants that have been associated with various
commondisorders byGWAS.[53,60] In addition to theminor effect sizes
these variants are often supposed to have individually, the sheer num-
ber of variants makes such functional verification challenging.[38,59] In
keeping with these challenges, recent studies using deep learning to
computationally predict putative causal variants or mechanistic path-
ways included no functional experiments.[54,58] Or, they did not link
variants and their predicted effects directly back to the disease phe-
notype by introducing or reverting variants in the genome of disease-
relevant cell or animalmodels. Rather, the forecasted functional effects
(such as on direction and degree of changes in gene expression) were
confirmed by artificial reporter gene constructs introduced to cell
lines.[55–57] Furthermore, in all studies, the value of the models to
pinpoint causal variants was supported by showing that regulatory
changes predicted for curated pathogenic variants or variants found in
patients differed significantly from changes forecasted for variants in
unaffected people.
Thus, the deep learning approaches appear to not directly provide
“rigorous” causal knowledge, but rather point to putative causal rela-
tions that may be further tested by experimental interventions.
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THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF EXPERIMENTALLY
VALIDATED KNOWLEDGE
If and towhat extent such rigorous experimental verification can play a
role to prove computationally predicted causality of genetic variants in
complex diseases seems uncertain, however.
There are mainly two reasons for this uncertainty. First, the
number of variants with small effect sizes will further increase by
ever larger GWAS,[60,61] likely paralleled by an increase in compu-
tationally predicted causal variants. Second, the complex genetic,
physiological or developmental processes that generate phenotypes
and common diseases are highly dynamic and driven by regulatory
feedback and hierarchical interactions (including cell- and tissue-level
interactions or environmental cues).[62,63] They may therefore be
better represented and understandable by systems genetics and
network approaches.[61,63,64] Based on multilevel and integrative
modeling such approaches try to analyze biological systems as awhole,
focusing on the relevant interactions in networks of genes or proteins
that occur in cell types or tissues.[63,64] However it remains unclear
which experimental and analytical approaches may allow to more
fully recapitulate and validate true network behavior across time.[65]
Due to the limited accessibility of most living human tissues to direct
experimental assays, these networks often need to be inferred from
large omics data byML and statistical methods.[64]
A future, inwhich “rigorous” proof of causal relations betweengeno-
type and (disease) phenotype by experimental intervention will pre-
vail, should thus not be taken for granted. Instead, linking AI-predicted
candidates for causal variants and pathways to disease by integra-
tive computational models involving tissue specific gene and protein
networks[55,58,66]—which themselves may have to largely be inferred
in silico—could becomemorewidespread.
Distinct implications for research, translation and
clinical practice
Such a potential shift toward scientific explanation derived from AI
predictions would challenge the (self-)conceptions of scientific under-
standing and “quality” of knowledge based on experimental interven-
tions, that still appear to prevail in important areas of basic biomedical
research (such as molecular genetics or physiology).[37,38,59] How-
ever, new techniques and approaches may be used to combine and
integrate rigorous molecular interventions with dynamic network
models toward exploring and distinguishing between possible causal
mechanisms, to understand how and why a process occurs in a certain
manner over time.[45,62] Thus approaches that combine human GWAS
data with experimentation-derived tissue- and cell-type-specific net-
works from suitablemodel organisms (such as Caenorhabditiselegans or
mouse) may help to experimentally test actionable network elements
and look more at systems behavior.[66,67] Furthermore, genome-wide
and combinatorial functional screening by CRISPR/Cas-mediated
methods in tissue cultures derived from human induced pluripotent
stem cells (hiPSCs) may contribute to probe disease-relevant network
models.[38,59,68,69]
Likewise such a shift would raise questions about implications for
translation of knowledge for drug development. Thus retrospective
studies on drug approvals suggest that genetic support linking drug
targets to disease significantly increases the likelihood for successful
drug development. This appears to be in particular true if there is clear
causal genetic evidence (e.g., when causal genes were identified in
severe genetic disorders, as opposed to mere statistical associations
of common genetic variants by GWAS).[47,70] Similarly, such genetic
evidence for effects of variants on phenotypes in tissues or organs
can be used to predict safety issues linked to drug targets.[71] Does
this mean that less “well-founded” causal knowledge derived from
AI/ML-based approaches would impair drug development? Not neces-
sarily, for such knowledge might still help solving the pharmaceutical
industry’s research and development (R&D) productivity challenge: to
increase the number and quality of cost-effective new drugs, without
incurring unsustainable R&D costs.[72] Computational models to
(more) rapidly pinpoint “reasonably good bets” (e.g., putative causal
variants) for drug targets may be combined with AI-based, automated
approaches for identifying, designing, synthesizing or repurposing
drug candidates in shorter time,[10,73,74] andwithmore relevant target
validation by new cellular or animal disease models (i.e., models with
higher predictive validity).[75] Combining these approaches might
increase (overall) quality in selecting promising targets and shift
project closures to early stages, as well as reduce development cycle
times and cost. All these factors have been linked to enhanced R&D
productivity.[72,75,76]
Possible effects by AI/ML-based approaches on the quality of
causal knowledge about genetic variants and mechanisms may even
be less clear when it comes to clinical trials and clinical medical prac-
tice (i.e., to infer diagnoses or to reach decisions on treatments).
This is because the role and value of basic science and mechanis-
tic knowledge in these areas—and especially related to EBM, which
has become their dominant concept—is contentious among practition-
ers and in philosophy of medicine.[14,77–79] In EBM, RCTs and sys-
tematic reviews of such studies are widely seen as the “gold stan-
dard” for judging diagnostic tests and/or treatments, and making rec-
ommendations on them. Proving causality in RCTs relies on showing
that a treatment makes a difference for the probability of patient out-
comes. Mechanistic reasoning, that is, inferring patient outcomes fol-
lowing interventions in the pathophysiological mechanisms, is gener-
ally ranked as evidence of low quality by EBM proponents.[77] This
has been ascribed to the challenges and failures in making such infer-
ences due to confounding factors (like interactions between vari-
ous mechanisms) linked to the complexity of common diseases.[78]
However, mechanistic knowledge and reasoning may play a role
in interpreting trial results, for instance to successfully transfer
recommendations from the test population to a different (target)
population.[46,77,78]
Similarly, the role of basic science and mechanistic knowledge
for diagnosis is far from clear. Expert clinicians appear to rarely
use basic science or causal pathophysiological knowledge, which
rather gets “encapsulated” in diagnostic labels or high-level, simplified
models.[80,81] Yet mobilization of such knowledge can become benefi-
cial when cases are rare or complex.[80]
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DIVISIONS IN CAUSE AND EXPLANATION:
BLACK-BOX CAUSAL CLAIMS VERSUS EXPLAINING
WHY AN EFFECT OCCURS
The apparent divide in the importance of causal knowledge on phys-
iological mechanisms between biomedical research and clinical trials
and medical practice is not created because causal claims do not play
a role in inferring diagnoses or in evaluating the efficacy of treatments
by EBM. But rather because the foundations and purposes of causal
claims in these application areas are usually different from the mech-
anistic theories of causality in biomedical research.
Making use of RCTs to assess and make recommendations on
diagnostic methods and therapies, in particular, appears to relate
to difference making probabilistic conceptions of causation. Under
these conceptions, causation requires that a cause (e.g., a drug)makes a
difference for the probability of its effect (patient outcome).[14,16] Cau-
sation may be seen as a form of correlation after all, under conditions
where, ideally, all biases or confounding factors are controlled.[14,46]
In RCTs randomization is used to control for putative other difference-
making, confounding factors between treatment and control groups
(such as age or comorbidities) that may affect the probability for a
given outcome. Since they provide nomechanistic rationale for why an
intervention entails a certain outcome, difference-making probabilistic
approaches like RCTs can usually only provide black-box causal claims
(Box2) about the (statistical) effectiveness of interventions in a studied
population.[14,15,46]
These differences in the foundations of causal claims thus appear to
be linked to two kinds of use: an inferential use to infer causal relation-
ships between interventions and outcomes (e.g., in RCTs) or to predict
effects of interventions (e.g., by transferring RCT results to new tar-
get groups), and an explanatory use to tell why an effect occurred.[16]
The difference-making conception of causation in EBM is suited for
inferential use, but it does not suffice for explanatory use; that is, why
the effect occurs. Such explanation needs knowledge on linking causal
mechanisms.[16,17]
MISSING EXPLANATIONS AND THEIR SUPPOSED
ROLE FOR POLICY
Present-day ML methods share some features with EBM’s difference-
making probabilistic conceptions for (black-box) causal claims. For
these methods also use correlative associations to predict outcomes
and can showmarked black-box characteristics (Box 2). However, they
are not designed to exclude or control for biases or confounding fac-
torswith respect to the found associations (e.g., between certainmuta-
tions or treatments and patient outcomes) in order to make any causal
claims.
When it comes to policies on applying AI/ML-based systems for
medical innovations, it appears to be not this fundamental, concep-
tual difference regarding causality and its implications that are dis-
cussed most, though. Instead, discussions and proposals often focus
on the black-box properties or opacity of certain ML techniques such
as deep learning (Box 2), for they may be linked to possible flaws and
biases in data and models.[18,19,12] Furthermore, the (missing) “inter-
pretability” or “explainability” of the inner workings of these black-
boxes has widely been suggested to be key for trust in, and adoption
of AI/ML-based applications or innovations.[18,21–23] Though no com-
mon definitions of “interpretability” or “explainability” exist, there are
two more widely accepted dimensions of these terms: transparency of
models and post-hoc interpretability.[12] Transparent models convey
some degree of interpretability by themselves, for example, if a model
is simple enough that a human can contemplate the entire model at
once (simulatability) or if one canunderstandhow it produces anygiven
output from its input data (algorithmic transparency). Post-hoc inter-
pretations do typically not explicate specifically how a model works,
but provide explanations by examples (such as similar training exam-
ples) or text explanations for already made predictive outcomes.[12,13]
The meaning and, in turn, the usefulness of “interpretability” or expla-
nations on how and why AI/ML systems produce the output they do
will thus differ between groups of people. For instance, detailed infor-
mation on inputs or algorithms may be useful for software developers
and to some extent also regulators, in order to test, evaluate and/or
improve models. But such information might be less understandable
andmeaningful to (end-)users of the systems, like clinicians or patients.
For them, post-hoc explanations may be more helpful. These differ-
ences might thus also affect the perception of benefits and possible
risks (such as ethical and social issues linked to hidden biases in mod-
els) and therefore trust in applications.
Medical AI regulation and explainability
Despite the suggestions that the black-box character of certain
advanced AI/ML-systems may affect their assessment of safety and
effectiveness, current regulatory schemes (e.g., in Europe and theUSA)
that cover such systems, as so called Software as aMedical Device, lack
clear standards on “explainability” or “interpretability”.[82] Yet under
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s medical device regulations
developers should provide information such as an “explanation of how
the software works”,[83] and the ability of clinicians to “understand”
or “independently review” the basis of recommendations is important
to initially decide whether to regulate a software.[83] It appears
still unclear, however, to what the mainly technical information that
developers must disclose (such as “the logic or rationale used by an
algorithm”)[84] had to amount to in practice. This issue may be partic-
ularly relevant for modern deep learning approaches since these lack
this sort of algorithmic transparency, thoughupcoming “explainableAI”
techniquesmay help to provide some relevant information[12] (Box 2).
Explainability as the key for trust and adoption:
“pretty conjecture” or “demonstrable knowledge”?
Similarly, understanding how andwhy a prediction or recommendation
was made has been argued to be crucial for trust in and adoption of
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AI/MLapplications by stakeholders at large, andbyusers in themedical
domain in particular.[18,12,21,85] However, there exist considerable diffi-
culties and variance in defining “explainability” or “trust”, and in empir-
ically assessing the role of explanations for trust in AI-based systems
or recommendations.[22,13,86,87] Moreover, trust in such systems and
their outcomes may depend on various factors, in general [86] and in
themedical domain.[88–90]
For instance, several studies on early AI-based systems suggest that
users appreciate explanatory features.[91] Yet empirical evidence that
such features may actually increase trust or confidence in a system’s
recommendations is rather limited and mixed,[92–95] and it remains
unclear to what extent these mostly laboratory studies (such as on
hypothetical e-commerce websites) can be conferred to “real-life” set-
tings or the medical domain. Also, the role of explanations for trust
can depend on users’ prior beliefs or expectations on outcomes.[96]
Finally, empirical studies on AI systems for different tasks suggest that
various other factors can affect trust, such as a system’s reliability,
the perceived level of machine intelligence (e.g., in form of personal-
ized outputs or responses), or questions regarding who is intended to
benefit.[86]
Someof these empirical findings also appear to resonatewith obser-
vations on trust of physicians and patients in diagnoses or recommen-
dations involving such systems. Thus the belief that AI does not take
into account one’s unique characteristics and circumstances (“unique-
ness neglect”) can be an important factor that impedes trust and use of
AI systems.[97] Or, when a physician uses AI, trust of patients seems to
depend on the physician and its confirmation of the AI system’s recom-
mendation, rather than on explanations on the system’s performance
or on how it works.[97] Likewise, trust by patients in physicians in gen-
eral appears to be not strongly dependent on being involved in med-
ical decision making, but is most closely linked to the personality and
behavior of physicians.[88] Lastly, given the difficulty in keeping upwith
the rapidly expanding breadth and depth of medical knowledge, clini-
cal practice guidelines (CPGs) play an important role in current clinical
decision making.[98,99] CPGs on how to include the outputs of specific
AI-based systems in decisions might play a key role for trust and adop-
tion by physicians, not least because of unclear liability issues linked
to the use of AI systems.[100,101] Similar to the evidence on the role
of explanations for trust in AI systems by physicians or patients, vari-
ous studies indicate that diffusion or uptake ofmedical innovations is a
complex social process and depends on many factors and their inter-
relations, including marketing, data from clinical trials or regulatory
environments.[102–104]
Thus a too strong focus on “interpretability” or “explainability” at
the expense of other elements appears to be wrong-headed. In addi-
tion to raising ethical questions,[17] trading “nudged” trust and accep-
tance based on “plausible” explanations for potentially better patient
outcomes or proof by clinical trials may be myopic, since such trust
could be short-lived. Further evidence on what type of information on
AI applications and provisions can sustainably generate trust in and
adoption of medical AI systems will be needed to inform more differ-
entiated policies.
WHY CAUSALITY MATTERS AND WHAT MAY
DETERMINE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
A too strong or even single focus on “interpretability” or “explainabil-
ity” ofAI/MLsystemsmayalsobe less rewarding thanwidely suggested
when it comes to assessing and approving the efficacy and safety of
such systems, given the only correlative knowledge currentMLmodels
can provide. Similarly, towhat degreeMLmodelswill transform knowl-
edge generation in genomic and biomedical research may depend on
whether such systems can once provide causal inference, and on how
people in these areas will rate such causal models and their underlying
assumptions.
Mind the causality gap: Explainability should not
become all-important for approval of biomedical AI
systems
As regards evaluation and approval, we contend that rigorous test-
ing with respect to patient outcomes of AI-based systems for diag-
nosis and treatment recommendations (e.g., by RCTs or prospective
cohort studies[21,52,101]) will be required as the most important ele-
ment. This is because of the conceptional issue that, even if made
“explainable”, current high-capacity AI methods can only account for
how associations (and predictions based on them) have been drawn by
the software.[4,105] These statistical modeling methods and interpre-
tations of how they work cannot provide causal inferences (e.g., that a
diagnosis and cognate intervention by a treatment will be effective), at
least not without existing causal knowledge or making causal assump-
tions (“no causes in; no causes out”).[105–108] Integrating counterfac-
tual reasoning into currentML algorithmsmay however improve accu-
racy of associative diagnosis models, especially for rare and very rare
diseases.[109] Yet, ultimately, any causal assumption may need exper-
imental control and cannot be inferred from statistical associations
alone.[107]
As longas this conceptional issuepersists, it appearsworth to recon-
sider making “explainability” or “interpretability” an all-important ele-
ment for the approval of AI methods. Furthermore, giving priority to
“explanations” and “understanding” of such methods over potentially
higher performance of certain AI systems[12] and/or the best available
evidence on patient outcomes, poses ethical as well as legal issues.
These include important questions as to whether patients have the
right to benefit from, and doctors the duty to use the most effective
diagnosis systems or treatments.[17,100]
Technological and social or psychological factors will
shape AI’s future in biomedical research
To what extent AI systems in biomedical research can develop a
role beyond a quicker or more comprehensive means for the gen-
eration of hypotheses (such as on causal genetic variants or drug
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candidates) will depend on both technological and social or psycholog-
ical factors.
Various efforts aim to develop AI methods to identify causal rela-
tions from observational and interventional data, by incorporating
causal and counterfactual reasoning in suitable high-capacity ML sys-
tems, such as deep learning models. Proposed solutions include com-
bining structural causal modeling and representation learning,[51] or
neural computing frameworks to infer causality from time series (i.e.,
grounded on the assumptions of time-order).[110,111] However, in how
far and atwhich level (e.g., single genes or complex networks) such new
methods might once “establish” causal relationships in genomics and
genomic medicine remains to be seen. An important issue may be to
what degree the assumptions underlying such methods can be tested
by (and stand up to) experimental approaches in cells or organisms.
Furthermore, the role ofAImethods in research and their relation to
causal knowledge will likely not only depend on new algorithms or the
kind of observational or interventional data used. But these issuesmay
also be affected by the extent to which causal relations (such as patho-
physiological mechanisms), be they “established” by future “causal AI”
systems or only predicted by current associative ones, will be accepted
or perceived to require experimental validation. This may be deter-
mined by entrenched andnewly upcoming beliefs or thinking about sci-
entific methods (including new AI models and their underlying causal
assumptions), results and theories among groups of scientists. Work
from the history and philosophy of science and from cognitive sciences
suggests an important role for such often “incommensurable” kinds
of perception and thinking, that underlie concepts such as “thought
styles”,[112] “paradigms”[113] or “habits of minds”,[114] in both continu-
ous and radical conceptual (“revolutionary”) scientific change. A puta-
tive change in perception and thinking regarding causality, and thus sci-
entific self-conceptions and understanding, may not least be driven by
newpeople fromor close to theAI field, who enter biomedical research
and education. In keepingwith this, recent empirical data frombiomed-
ical research indicate that such change by “outsiders” can be fostered
by the premature death of eminent scientists in a research area.[115]
Obviously such potential change by “new entrants” does not mean
that AI talent or people from other areas will not be needed or should
not move into genomic research and biomedicine, or that biomedical
researchers and clinicians should not be educated in AI. Quite to the
contrary, such influx of expertise will be required to further advance
the use of AI in biomedicine, and its opportunities outlined above. Yet
in addition tomutual learningbetween scientist fromboth fields, young
scientists at the interface of the two fields might benefit from courses
with input from biomedical and AI scientists with diverse thinking as
well as from other relevant fields such as philosophy of science or cog-
nitive sciences.
CONCLUSIONS
Current associative AI models are in stark contrast to the strong
foundation of intervention-based conceptions of causation in genomic
research and medicine. Given this fundamental conceptual difference,
present discussions and policy proposals too narrowly focus on the
black-box issue. Notions of making “explainability” or “interpretabil-
ity” of AI models an all-important element for their assessment or for
generating sustained trust need rethinking. Rather, the future develop-
ment of knowledge fromAImodels for genomic research andmedicine,
their adoption and possible societal benefits will, for one thing, depend
on whether such models can develop beyond hypotheses generators
and association-based prediction tools, as generating rigorous causal
knowledge by experimental intervention is laborious and costly. For
another, in particular as regards direct medical applications like diag-
nostics, respective policies demanding clinical trials will be critical.
Both the development of AI-based knowledge and policies on its use
will not only hinge on technological progress on causal AI models and
means to test them and their underlying assumptions experimentally.
But they will also be driven by how such knowledge is perceived or
judged by different actors.
Given the complexity and broad implications of issues ranging from
scientific understanding to adoption of innovations, as well as the cur-
rent scarcity of evidence on how to best govern these issues, the
development of policies for different contexts may need engagement
with people and perspectives from different disciplines and societal
groups. Such inclusive approaches—which should not be expected to
produce simple consensus but rather learn about and recognize dif-
ferent needs, preferences or (scientific) thinking—may reduce the risk
that education, R&D and policy schemes to govern them succumb
to one-dimensional concepts. These could narrow down, rather than
broaden and leverage, the potential for societal benefits from using AI
to understand genome function in biomedical research and to advance
genomic medicine.
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